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PURPOSE The objective of this study was to determine the extent to which the dualprocess theory of medical diagnosis enjoys neuroscientific support. To that end, the study explored whether neurological correlates of system-2 thinking could be located in the brain. It was hypothesised that system-2 thinking could be observed as the activation of the prefrontal cortex.
METHOD An experimental paradigm was applied that consisted of a learning and a test phase. During the learning phase, 22 medical students were trained in diagnosing chest Xrays. Four of these eight cases were presented repeatedly, to develop a high level of expertise for these cases. During the test phase, all eight cases were presented and the participants' prefrontal cortex was scanned using functional near-infrared spectroscopy. Response time and diagnostic accuracy were recorded as behavioural indicators.
RESULTS
The results revealed that participants' diagnostic accuracy in the test phase was significantly higher for the trained cases as compared with the untrained cases (F [1, 21] = 138.80, p < 0.001, g 2 = 0.87). Also, their response time was significantly shorter for these cases (F [1, 21] = 18.12, p < 0.001, g 2 = 0.46). Finally, the results revealed that only for the untrained cases, could a significant activation of the anterolateral prefrontal cortex be observed (F [1, 21] = 21.00, p < 0.01, g 2 = 0.34).
CONCLUSION The fact that only untrained cases triggered higher levels of blood oxygenation in the prefrontal cortex is an indication that system-2 thinking is a cognitive process distinct from system 1. Implications of these findings for the validity of the dualprocess theory are discussed. 
INTRODUCTION
The nature of medical diagnosis remains something of an enigma. The mystery is caused by the fact that most of the thinking processes involved in generating a diagnosis are not directly accessible and their sources difficult to trace. It is evident that knowledge and experience are involved in successful diagnosis, but how these are stored in memory and activated by the interaction with a patient is still largely unknown. 1, 2 Stimulated by the work on intuitive and analytical reasoning by Nobel laureate Daniel Kahneman and others, 3, 4 the dualprocess theory is currently the most prominent theory guiding diagnostic reasoning research in medicine. 5 This theory posits that, while diagnosing a clinical case, one of two reasoning modes becomes dominant: system 1 or system 2.
4 System 1 is considered intuitive and fast, dependent on automatic activation of 'illness scripts' or 'exemplars' of a particular disease stored in memory and leading to effortless pattern recognition. 6, 7 System 2, by contrast, is considered analytic, slow, deliberate and systematic. 8 (There are other theoretical frameworks to study diagnostic reasoning, but we will use this dual-process paradigm as our guiding framework for the research presented in this study).
Research on dual-process theory relies predominately on two behavioural measures: response time and diagnostic accuracy scores. 9 For instance, Sherbino et al. conducted a study in which they examined the relation between response time and diagnostic error. They recruited 75 residents who diagnosed 25 written cases of varying difficulty levels. The results suggest that if participants spent a longer time diagnosing the cases, their accuracy scores decreased. 10 In a study by Ilgen and colleagues, case difficulty and level of expertise were manipulated to explore how they affect diagnostic accuracy. The study included 393 clinicians with varying levels of expertise (i.e. medical students, residents and faculty members from emergency and internal medicine departments). They were given 12 written case vignettes, of which half were considered simple and the other half were complex. The results showed that more experienced physicians performed better than their less experienced counterparts and that more complex medical cases resulted in significantly lower diagnostic accuracy scores. Although response time was not significantly different between participants with different levels of expertise, one could observe a trend suggesting that more experienced participants had lower response times as compared with less experienced participants. 11 Overall, findings based on these variables suggest that physicians with more expertise have generally higher diagnostic accuracy scores and require less time to reach a diagnosis as compared with physicians with less expertise. 10, 11 These performance differences between expert and less expert clinicians are almost universally attributed to differences in the manner the brain processes the clinical cases involved. 5, 12 However, direct evidence of such processes in the brain is largely lacking, because of the limited availability of neuroscientific research. The neuroscientific correlates of dualprocess theory in medicine have not been established yet; this line of research is currently in its infancy. 13 The dual-process theory assumes that intuitive and analytic responses to a problem activate distinctively different processes in the brain. 5 However, time to diagnosis and diagnostic accuracy are insufficiently precise measures to allow for such distinction. Therefore, studying clinical reasoning using a neuroscientific approach may be helpful because it can open up a new operational window to this question. The objective of this study was to test the hypothesis that system-2 thinking is associated with a significantly higher activation of the prefrontal cortex as compared with system-1 thinking. The prefrontal cortex is known to support conscious and effortful reasoning (as opposed to automatic and effortless recognition) and thus should be more active during slow and deliberate system-2 thinking. [14] [15] [16] [17] To test this hypothesis, an experimental paradigm was developed that enabled measuring blood oxygenation in the prefrontal cortex while diagnosing medical cases under conditions of different levels of expertise.
There are several neuroscientific studies that examined predictions of the dual-process theory. However, these studies were predominantly conducted outside the field of clinical reasoning. Most of the work carried out was on the belief-bias effect in syllogistic reasoning tasks. [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] Neuroimaging research conducted in this field with functional near-infrared spectroscopy (fNIRS) suggests that different anatomical regions in the brain are responsible for the two distinct reasoning systems. The question is, however, to what extent logical reasoning, required for solving syllogisms, is similar to knowledge-based reasoning, required for the diagnosis of clinical cases. Medical diagnosis involves much knowledge and practical experience to deal with the vast array of signs and symptoms produced by disease. 23 If one intends to study the validity of dual-process theory for understanding clinical reasoning, one has to investigate how clinical cases are processed. 24 Most current research into clinical reasoning makes use of clinical vignettes. These are, however, less suited for use in neuroimaging studies. Written cases take time to read and do not allow for the immediate recognition processes assumed under system 1. In addition, the cognitive processes of thinking and reading are taking place simultaneously while perhaps activating different processes in the brain. 25 These may be reasons why initial attempts in the domain of medicine to differentiate between system 1 and system 2 were met with limited success. 26 A typical observation in these studies is that there is similar brain activity for written cases that were designed to elicit system-1 thinking and cases that were designed to elicit system-2 thinking (e.g. cases in which important diagnostic information was omitted, and thus, more brain activity was to be expected in the prefrontal cortex area). Disentangling reading and reasoning processes in the brain is challenging. For that reason, we restricted diagnostic reasoning in this study to the visual diagnosis of chest X-rays.
A third problem with studies purporting to be able to distinguish between the two types of reasoning is that they are 'quasi-experimental'. It is common practice in these studies to select participants with different levels of expertise. Thereby it is assumed that experts would rely more on system-1 thinking and novices would rely more on system-2 thinking. There may, however, be other reasons why experts are faster and more accurate than novices; for instance, because experience has taught them that in most cases, it is not efficient to engage in elaborate analyses. Faster speed and greater accuracy are therefore not necessarily only the result of experts engaging in another type of reasoning.
In summary, existing studies in this domain, employing text-based stimuli and quasiexperimentation, have not been able to unequivocally demonstrate that, for knowledgebased diagnostic reasoning, a distinction between fast system-1 and slow system-2 reasoning is meaningful. In the neuroimaging study reported here, we attempted to avoid these pitfalls. First, we had our participants, second-year medical students, diagnose chest X-rays. These images allow for an immediate diagnosis, so that fast recognition can be more easily distinguished from slow analysis, as was possible in existing studies.
Second, we trained our students in half of the Xrays that they had to diagnose, ensuring fast pattern recognition for these images, whereas they encountered the other half of the images only once. In a previous study, we could show that this withinsubjects experimental approach to the expertise issue, resulted in very reliable differences in performance. In a test phase, following the training phase, the images for which expertise was developed were diagnosed almost three times faster and with much higher accuracy. 27 Third, we used fNIRS to observe the extent to which differences in the level of blood oxygenation of the prefrontal cortex would emerge that could be explained by our experimental manipulation. It was hypothesised that system-2 activity, associated with analytical thinking related to the prefrontal cortex, should be observable by means of increased oxygenation of that area when participants encountered cases for which they were not trained, involving working memory, attention and cognitive control, 15, 16 whereas the absence of brain activity in that area (in the presence of trained cases) would indicate that system-1 activity takes place in another part of the brain. We chose fNIRS over other neuroimaging techniques, such as functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), for three reasons. First of all, fNIRS has higher temporal resolution as compared with fMRI. 28 Second, fNIRS has lower sensitivity to motion artefacts; that is, the study can be conducted outside the laboratory in a more naturalistic setting. Third, fNIRS is more cost effective than fMRI, requiring less than half of the operating cost of an fMRI.
METHOD

Participants
Participants were 25 Year-2 medical students, of which three were removed from further analysis as it turned out that the neuroimaging data were not fully recorded during the study. The remaining 22 participants (nine men and 13 women) had an average age of 20 years (standard deviation [SD], 0.61; range, 19-22 years). The Edinburgh Handedness Inventory 29 was used, which classified 19 as right handed. All participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. The participants were in good health. The study was conducted in accordance with the principles of the Declaration of Helsinki. Ethical approval was granted by the University Institutional Review Board. Prior to the study, participants were informed about the procedures involved and provided written informed consent. Participants received a US$35 voucher for their participation.
Materials
We prepared eight clinical cases, consisting of radiological images without clinical vignettes. The images used were anonymised chest X-rays (from a hospital image bank). The cases represented the following medical conditions: collapse, consolidation, effusion, lung mass, bulla, emphysema, fibrosis and pneumothorax (see Appendix S1 for an example).
Procedure
The study was conducted at two stations. The first station consisted of a learning phase, whereas the second station constituted a test phase with fNIRS scanning. At the learning station, participants worked with a computer on which information was presented online via Qualtrics (2016) (Provo, UT, USA). Participants were shown all eight clinical cases once (familiarisation run). Each case included the following information: the name of the condition, a definition of the condition, bullet points highlighting three major signs and symptoms that are most typical for the condition, and a chest X-ray with arrows and stars indicating significant anatomical features (Appendix S1).
After the familiarisation run, four randomly selected chest X-rays (without additional information) appeared on screen and the participants had to select the correct diagnosis from eight possible answer options, which were presented in random order as well (Appendix S2). If participants made a mistake, they received additional training. This was done by showing them the same slide they had received during the familiarisation. After this (or when they selected the correct answer), the next image appeared and so on. There was a maximum of four runs with each of the four trials. The last trial in each run was a time trial. Participants had to select the correct response in <5 seconds. If they exceeded this time limit, they had to repeat the run, up to a maximum of four runs. This was done to assure that all participants attained a high level of pattern recognition for the four cases they were trained for (see Fig. 1 for an overview). All participants completed run 1, 19/22 run 2, 9/22 run 3 and 1/22 run 4.
At the second station, participants were shown all eight chest X-rays, one at a time, with the stimulus presentation software SuperLab 5 (Cedrus Corporation, San Pedro, CA, USA). Their task was to look at the image and think of a diagnosis. To indicate whether they knew or did not know the diagnosis, they could press either 'I know' or 'I do not know' on a keyboard (key positions were counterbalanced). The time it took to recognise the case was captured by SuperLab. After this, the next case emerged and so on. Cases were presented in block design; all trained cases and all untrained cases were presented together, but in random order (see Fig. 2 ).
During this procedure, participants' oxy-Hb and deoxy-Hb concentration values were measured in the frontal cortex area using NIRSport TM . Signal capture and processing were carried out with NIRStar (version 14-2) and nirsLAB (version 2017.06), respectively (NIRx Medical Technologies LLC, Glen Head, NY USA). This fNIRS system uses near-infrared light at 760 and 850 nm. A head cap with a 7 9 7 array of light emitters and detectors was used, resulting in 20 data channels (Appendix S3). After the block presentation, all eight cases reappeared in random order and participants had to type in the diagnosis for each case. This enabled us to assess the diagnostic accuracy.
Analysis
For the behavioural performance data, we generated mean diagnostic accuracy scores and mean response times for trained and untrained cases, respectively. Two one-way repeated-measures analyses of variance (ANOVA) were conducted to examine whether there were significant withinsubject differences between the trained and untrained cases. The analyses were conducted with IBM-SPSS (version 24, IBM Corp., Armonk, NY, USA).
NIRS is a non-invasive functional neuroimaging technique that enables monitoring of brain activity by measuring absorption of the near-infrared light through the skull. 30 The absorption spectra of oxygenated haemoglobin (oxy-Hb) and deoxygenated haemoglobin (deoxy-Hb) are distinctively different, which enables determining concentration changes in the oxy-Hb and deoxy-Hb from diffusely scattered light measurements. 31 This gives fNIRS the advantage over several other neuroimaging techniques (e.g. fMRI, PET and MEG), because of its ability to directly measure a wide range of functional contrasts, such as oxy-Hb and deoxy-Hb and total haemoglobin, directly with very high temporal resolution. 32 Thus, haemodynamic responses can be studied as neural activation. Another advantage of fNIRS is its flexibility in experimental settings; it is a very compact measurement system and it is highly robust to the motion artefact compared with fMRI. 33 The preparation and processing of the fNIRS data were conducted using nirsLAB. For each subject, data were imported into nirsLAB, and signal quality was assessed and subjected to frequency filtering (filter type: band pass). After this, haemoglobin concentrations were calculated. As the signal quality was generally high across all 20 channels, all channels were included in the analysis.
Subsequently, we applied the conventional averaging (CA) procedure by generating the mean of oxy-Hb and deoxy-Hb concentration values across all channels, both blocks and across subjects for trained and untrained cases. The measurement window was set to 8 seconds (À2 seconds before onset stimulus presentation and 6 seconds after stimulus presentation). It was then tested whether there were statistically significantly differences in oxy-Hb between trained and untrained cases. To that end, a within-subject ANOVA was applied to examine differences in oxy-Hb between the maximum differences of the oxy-Hb trained and the oxy-Hb untrained cases.
Lastly, we applied statistical parametric mapping (SPM(t) Image Thresholded) to determine the brain coordinates (i.e. corresponding channels) that registered a statistically significant difference in oxyHb between the trained and untrained cases. 34 SPM is the application of random field theory (RFT) to make inferences about the topological features of statistical processes that are continuous functions of space or time. 35 It enables identifying regionally specific effects (i.e. brain activity) by comparing each pixel of the brain map in one analysis. Statistically unlikely clusters are interpreted as 'regionally specific effects' that can be attributed to the experimental manipulation. The analysis is based on the general linear model (GLM) and is used in the same way as with the conventional analyses of discrete data. However, RFT is used to resolve the multiple-comparison issue when making inferences over many comparisons, similar to the Bonferroni correction for discrete statistical tests.
RESULTS
We first analysed the behavioural data to explore whether the response time was shorter and the diagnostic accuracy higher for the trained cases versus the untrained cases. This was done to test whether the learning phase was successful in instilling expertise in the participants, in order to pattern recognise (i.e. system-1 application) the trained cases as they appeared together with untrained cases. The results suggest that the mean diagnostic accuracy score for the trained cases was significantly higher than for the untrained cases: F(1, 21) = 138.80, p < 0.001, g 2 = 0.87. Average response time for the trained cases was significantly shorter than for the untrained cases: F(1, 21) = 18.12, p < 0.001, g 2 = 0.46 (see Table 1 ). The effect sizes (g 2 ) indicate that 87% of the variation in diagnostic accuracy and 46% of the variation in response time could be attributed to the experimental manipulation of expertise (see Table 1 for an overview).
As a next step in the analysis, we examined whether there are significant differences in prefrontal cortex activation, signified by differences in oxy-Hb between the trained and untrained cases. The results suggest that the difference in oxy-Hb between the trained and untrained cases was significant, with the untrained cases resulting in significantly higher levels of oxy-Hb: F(1, 21) = 21.00, p < 0.01, g 2 = 0.34 (see Fig. 1 for an overview of the differences in oxy-Hb over time between trained and untrained cases).
Further, the results of the SPM analysis suggest that there were significant differences in brain activation between trained and untrained cases in the region of channels 11 and 13 (p < 0.05). These channels correspond with the anterolateral prefrontal cortex, frontal pole (Brodmann Area 10) (see Appendix S4 for a visual depiction of the results of the SPM analysis).
DISCUSSION
The objective of the present study was to establish the neuroscientific correlates of dual-process theory of medical diagnosis. To that end, we resorted to the diagnosis of radiology images. The results of the behavioural data show that diagnosis was three times more accurate for the trained cases than for the untrained cases (30% versus 90% accuracy). In addition, recognising trained cases was almost two times faster as compared with untrained cases (2.25 seconds versus 4.23 seconds). These findings suggest that, for the trained cases, we succeeded in instilling system-1-type pattern recognition in the participants. For the untrained cases, participants seemed to resort to a slower, more analytic approach. This switch from system 1 to system 2 could directly be observed by means of significant blood oxygenation in the anterolateral prefrontal cortex (Brodmann Area 10). This area was significantly more activated when participants were presented with untrained cases that required analytical processing. Previous neuroimaging studies have demonstrated that the anterolateral prefrontal cortex is activated during many high-level cognitive tasks that require coordination and integration of information processing, as when analytically generating a diagnosis. [14] [15] [16] [17] What are the implications of these findings? First, the present study is one of the first to provide neuroscientific support for the distinction between system-1 and system-2 diagnostic reasoning. Our findings support the notion that when participants engage in generating a diagnosis, depending on the nature of their knowledge and experience, such a diagnosis will be fast and intuitive, or slow and deliberate, in line with system 1 and 2, respectively, as it most likely involves different anatomical regions in the brain. As a result, our findings provide validity evidence for dualprocess theory of medical diagnosis of radiology images.
Second, with the present study, we introduced an (experimental) approach to the study of expertise in medicine that allows for significantly more control when conducting (neuroimaging) studies that require manipulation of the level of expertise. Historically, expertise in studies of medical decision making has been manipulated by selecting participants that are expected to already differ in their level of experience, as expressed by time since graduation, numbers of years in residency, etc. There are, however, serious problems associated with quasi-experimental designs. The most important is that participants are not randomly assigned to the conditions of the experiment. This opens the possibility of confounding bias. For instance, participants who differ in level of expertise in a particular domain may also differ in other respects, such as age, diagnostic strategy, reasoning preferences or socio-economic background. These confounders make it difficult to assign possible effects of the manipulation unambiguously to expertise differences. Our approach eliminates these issues as differences in level of expertise are experimentally induced by means of the learning phase. This has several advantages, besides the obvious benefit of tight experimental control through randomisation. First, students can be carefully selected based on their previous performance, homogenising the pool of participants. Second, as medical students in the same year of the same medical school tend to differ less from each other than residents or specialists who usually participate in such experiments, withingroup variance is less of a problem. Third, fewer participants are needed to reach statistical power, as our approach employs a within-group design. A reduction in participants is an important consideration when conducting brain imaging studies in which the number of participants is typically restricted due to time and cost constraints.
The present study has some limitations that need to be addressed. Strictly speaking, we only measured brain activation associated with system-2 thinking (i.e. the prefrontal cortex). With this study, we did not explore which anatomical region is associated with system-1 thinking. The reason for not doing so is twofold. First, our main aim was to demonstrate the dichotomy between both thinking systems. The fact that the prefrontal cortex was only activated when untrained cases were presented, and that no such activation took place when trained cases were presented, is in our view evidence for the dual nature of these thinking systems rather than support for the hypothesis that diagnosis is a unitary process. 36 Second, system-1 thinking most likely involves automatic retrieval of information from long-term memory. 37 A known restriction of using fNIRS is its penetration depth of about 2 cm. Therefore, fNIRS only allows for cortical measurements and it is not able to reach deeper regions of the brain. To address this shortcoming, future research should utilise fMRI, which enables scanning the entire brain. This would also allow further investigation of how both systems interact when generating a diagnosis. As an alternative to using fMRI, one could use fNIRS but start scanning the participants when they engage in the learning phase. It is to be hypothesised that during the initial part of the learning phase, when the cases are relatively new and unknown, a significant activation of the prefrontal cortex would be observed, similar to what we observed for the untrained cases. If the dual-process theory of medical diagnosis is correct, we predict that, when progressing through the learning phase, while participants develop expertise for these cases, prefrontal cortex activation should fade because these cases are now sufficiently incorporated in long-term memory. Fading of prefrontal cortex activation would be a test of this hypothesis.
A strength of the present approach to studying expertise in medicine, the attempt to install in students a high level of expertise in a limited domain, is at the same time a shortcoming. Although there is no a priori reason to believe that students, able to solve diagnostic problems accurately and quickly, engage in reasoning processes different from experts, a replication of our approach with experts would certainly add to the external validity of our findings.
In conclusion, our study demonstrated that system-1 and system-2 cognitive processes are represented in different parts of the brain, supporting their distinctiveness in reasoning about clinical cases using radiology images. More research into the external validity of our findings is, however, mandatory before the insights gained from this line of research have meaningful practical implications for medical education.
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